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Roger Smith 
 
Surface and depth: changing practice, changing rationales, common threads? 
As historical accounts have indicated, youth justice has been a site of continuous change and 
contention as it has developed over time (Hendrick, 2006; Muncie, 2009). Whilst there has seemed 
to be an emergent consensus that the troublesome behaviour of young people was indeed a 
‘problem’, the causes of this phenomenon and the appropriate form of intervention have remained 
in dispute. Such differences of opinion are in turn associated with alternative views of ‘childhood’, 
and competing political and ideological assumptions. As Muncie (2009, p. 78) puts it: ‘ideas about 
welfare and punishments, treatment and control, ‘moral danger’ and wilful criminality continue to 
circulate around’ and impact on policy and practice. As a result, we are predictably able to identify a 
great deal of variation in the way in which youth justice is organised and delivered, both historically, 
and geographically. Different phases in the development of youth justice in the UK have long been 
acknowledged (Hendrick, 2006), with specific eras associated with the dominance of the ‘welfare 
principle’ (1948 to the 1970s, according to Hendrick, 2006, p. 9), or with a ‘back to justice’ 
movement (the 1980s, according to Muncie, 2009, p. 288), for example.   
More recently, it has been suggested that youth justice practices in England and Wales1 came to 
exemplify a spirit of ‘institutionalised intolerance’ (Muncie, 1999), and certainly systemic behaviours 
and outcomes appeared to be consistent with this characterisation, at least until 2007. Whilst 
subsequent developments may have prompted a rethink of this formulation, the phrase itself is 
indicative of a recurrent and deep-rooted tendency to problematise young people and their 
behaviour. 
At the same time as we can observe patterns of incoherence and change in the domestic context, 
considerable international diversity is also detectable in policy and practice in relation to ‘youth 
crime’. Significant variations in are acknowledged, particularly in relation to key considerations, such 
as the age of criminal responsibility, or the rate at which young people are placed in custodial 
institutions (Muncie, 2009, p. 362; p. 363) Whilst Scandinavia, in particular, stands out because of its 
highly distinctive and ‘tolerant’ perspective (p. 373), there is nonetheless argued to be evidence of 
globalising tendencies towards convergence, according to Muncie, associated with ‘neo-
conservatism and punitive penal policies’ (p. 355).  
Other trends and developments in criminal justice can be detected, though, and these may be 
distinguished according to certain  ‘typologies’ of penal systems, which may in turn be correlated 
with other aspects of particular political and welfare ‘regimes’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006, p. 441), 
whether these are distributed geographically or historically. Different orientations to youth justice 
policies and practice are thereby claimed to be identifiable, typically demarcated by historical phases 
                                                          
1
 Whilst I hope to draw on a range of material and make an argument which is at least partly generalisable, my 
own experience principally relates to England, and so this inevitably influences the way in which this article is 
framed. Apologies for any unintended ethnocentrism. 
Final manuscript (NOT anonymised)
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or national boundaries, although there is evidence too of ‘justice by geography’ within jurisdictions, 
according to some sources (Feld, 1991; Bateman, 2011).  
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that such typologies tend to, and indeed usually intend 
to portray idealised, and therefore ‘unnatural’, accounts of the central tendencies of justice systems 
for the purpose of classification and analysis. Such Weberian ‘ideal types’ (Weber, 1957) are unlikely 
to be found in their pure form in practice anywhere; they are more likely to be helpful in 
exemplifying patterns and trends and perhaps providing a sense of dominant themes and perhaps, 
offering some idea of the direction of travel of policy and practice at a particular point in time, in a 
given geographical location. 
Even so, the picture may remain confused, as Muncie (2002, p. 156) has acknowledged, in 
suggesting that the recent history of youth justice in England and Wales can be seen to be 
characterised by a number of competing perspectives, effectively constituting an ‘amalgam of’ the 
following: ‘just desserts’; ‘risk assessment’; ‘managerialism’; ‘community responsibilisation’; 
authoritarian populism’; and ‘restorative justice’. He concludes that this ‘mélange of measures 
reveals the fundamental contradictions underlying a youth justice system cemented around loosely 
defined notions of ‘crime prevention and reduction’’ (Muncie, 2002, p. 156); although he also 
acknowledges that common underlying features are still to be noted, especially those of 
‘responsibilisation’ of children and their parents, individualisation of both risk and need, and the 
imposition of pseudo-scientific concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘performance management’ – perhaps implying 
thereby a form of ‘base/superstructure’ (Williams, 1973) articulation of the phenomenon. 
In making these observations, we should also pause to acknowledge that the articulation and 
realisation of youth justice policy and practice is historically specific, being grounded ultimately in 
the prevailing social and structural conditions. In Althusserian terms, the machinery of youth justice 
performs a dual function as both Ideological and Repressive State Apparatus (Althusser, 1970); and it 
can only be fully understood as a feature of a particular and concrete configuration of social 
relations. In contemporary terms, then, this means that we must make sense of the recent evidence 
of a liberalisation in youth justice (its outcomes, at least: Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board, 
2013, for example). As Yates (2012) has argued, for example, we need to factor in the rapid 
abandonment of young people and working class communities by the state. Recent trends do not, 
therefore, of themselves represent a wholesale or inherently sustainable revision of public or 
political attitudes and orientations towards young people and their (problematised) behaviour; nor, 
of course, does it offer much reassurance to those in disadvantaged neighbourhoods whose lives 
may be disrupted by unacceptable behaviour, as the left realists pointed out in a previous age of 
neo-liberal retrenchment (Lea and Young, 1984). That is to say, heated debates about the treatment 
of young people have merely been deferred, and not resolved (and most certainly not in the 
direction of a more enlightened and constructive approach to dealing with youth crime).  
Overall, though, what does seem to emerge from this brief overview is a sense of a disparate and 
hotly contested terrain, which is both highly politicised and acutely subject to the impact of wider 
social change, with competing discourses of childhood and a variety of ‘drivers’ supporting divergent 
approaches to policy and practice. These conflicting agendas are in turn manifested in partial and 
often unsatisfactory solutions to the problems which the behaviour of young people appear to pose 
for society in general. In what follows, I intend first to explore the possibility that an analysis of 
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‘typologies’ of youth justice offers some basis for greater clarity and understanding of patterns of 
policy and practice; and, subsequently, drawing on these insights, I intend to suggest that an 
alternative model, grounded in principles of ‘welfare + rights’ offers a distinctive and potentially 
productive way forward. 
 
Models and typologies: clarifying the issues? 
Despite the acknowledged limitations of ‘ideal types’, it will be useful to reflect on the contribution 
they are able to make to our conceptualisations of youth justice systems, and also to our capacity to 
articulate ‘possibilities’ for practice, especially when these may lead to creative and progressive 
models of intervention. A number of typologies have been developed, usually drawing on 
international comparative analysis, and it will be helpful to reflect on some of these attempts initially 
(Winterdyck, 1997; Bala et al, 2002; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Hazell, 2008; McAra, 2010). 
Winterdyk (1997, p. xi), for example, initially proposed a six-fold typology of models of juvenile 
justice, differentiated according to a number of characteristics, including key agency, functions, 
‘understanding of client behaviour’, purpose of intervention and objectives. Differentiated in this 
way the typology consisted of the following categories, on what he termed a ‘continuum’ of 
approaches: ‘participatory’, ‘welfare’, ‘corporatism’, ‘modified justice’, ‘justice’ and ‘crime control’, 
moving as might be expected from non- to increasingly punitive forms of intervention. Interestingly, 
at this point, in the late 1980s, interestingly the system prevailing in England and Wales was 
identified as ‘corporatist’ (Pratt, 1989). 
Writing somewhat later, Cavadino and Dignan (2006, p. 201) have suggested a five-fold typology, 
which again could be said to reflect a notional continuum: ‘minimum intervention’; ‘restorative 
justice’; welfare’; ‘neo-correctionalist’; and ‘justice’, linked in turn to particular ideological and 
theoretical perspectives. Hazel (2008), on the other hand, suggests that it is the persisting dichotomy 
between ’welfare’ and ‘justice’ perspectives which has remained dominant in youth justice , and that 
these should be seen as ‘extreme’ poles for the purposes of ‘mapping, and charting, the movement 
of systems and policies’ (p. 23). He concludes that ‘every other model that has been developed in 
the literature can be traced back to variations of these two basic types of approach’ (p. 24), despite 
his subsequent association of these further variations with clearly identifiable theoretical positions; 
and more specifically despite his contentious association of neo-correctionalism with the justice 
model. 
McAra (2010) does not agree with Hazel’s approach, claiming that it is an over-simplification of the 
‘myriad principles shaping both policy discourse in contemporary western societies [not to mention 
other national contexts] and the core imperatives that underpin international conventions (such as 
the Beijing Rules 1985)’ (p. 287). It is evident, for example, that ‘justice’ based approaches can be 
seen to differ significantly in their realisation, despite their common rhetorical basis. Arguments for 
‘justice for children’ (Morris et al, 1980) in the 1980s had a strong flavour of children’s rights about 
them, and were invoked to support that decade’s liberalising tendencies; whilst due process 
principles were equally championed during the 1990s with very different consequences (Smith, 
2003). 
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McAra, following Muncie (2002), quite rightly emphasises that there is likely to be a disparity 
between the overarching goals and intentions of any given youth justice ‘system’, its infrastructural 
and organisational implementation and its precise impact and outcomes at the point of delivery. 
Nonetheless, attempting to articulate ‘models’ at system level does appear to serve a purpose in her 
view in that it captures the sense of purpose which shapes specific jurisdictional approaches, and 
perhaps also offers some clues as to how youth justice cultures and practices may be shaped by the 
prevailing institutional ethos.  
McAra (2010, p. 288) suggests that four ‘paradigms…arguably, have come to dominate youth justice 
discourse: just deserts; welfare; restoration; and ‘actuarialism’. Each of these offers a different 
solution to the problem of balancing the needs of the vulnerable offender with the needs of society’, 
which is identified as the central problematic of ‘all youth justice systems’. These paradigms are said 
to be differentiated across three dimensions, namely, concepts of ‘personhood’ and ‘social 
relations’, and models of intervention, for example. Children are viewed as rights and responsibilities 
to a greater or lesser extent; their inherent qualities are differentiated; and accordingly, judgements 
of the appropriate balance between controlling and enabling interventions also vary. Important 
distinctions are drawn correspondingly between the ‘rights’ which might be ascribed to children and 
young people, who are also deemed to be individually ‘responsible’ for their actions under a ‘just 
deserts’ model, and the ‘entitlements’ owed to them by state and community under the ‘welfare’ 
model, in a context where they are not viewed as fully responsible (not least because their needs 
have not been met). Paradoxically here, the ‘just deserts’ model applies the principle of 
proportionality in setting limits to the level of intervention justifiable in light of the specific 
‘responsible’ action of the young person; whereas the needs-based model does not, since the level 
of intervention is implicitly justified by what is deemed to be required to compensate for or 
eliminate whatever deficit or disadvantage which the child may be experiencing. McAra (2010, p. 
291) argues that the ‘actuarial’ model is similarly unconcerned with the child as a rights-bearing 
rational actor, but rather views him/her as a source of calculable risk (see Smith, 2006) which is 
capable of being managed, and which should be controlled in the interests of the wider society. 
‘Expert involvement is crucial to the assessment of risk’ (McAra, 2010, p. 291), and the nature and 
level of intervention are determined simply by what is required to ensure public protection and 
reassurance. It is only the ‘restorative’ paradigm that attempts to integrate assumptions about 
children’s ‘entitlements and rights’, and to recognise the ‘social’ dimension of offending: ‘Under a 
restorative paradigm the aim of intervention is to support victims, restore the harm caused and 
reconnect the offender to the community’ (p. 291). Although the assumption of children’s rationality 
is complemented here by an acknowledgement of the social context of their ‘crimes’, it is perhaps 
less clear that a restorative model is inherently concerned with meeting their ‘entitlements’, 
particularly as the model is typically constructed as being principally focused on the offence alone, at 
the expense of the ‘connections between the child and their wider social situation’ (Haines and 
O’Mahony, 2006, p. 121). 
Despite potential quibbles about the precise characteristics of the paradigms outlined by McAra, 
they do provide a systematic basis for subsequent reflection, not least concerning the fundamental 
questions of how we ‘assess’ their various merits and determine how to intervene in light of them 
McAra, 2010, p. 291). As she acknowledges, though, attempts to articulate global encompassing 
frameworks for juvenile justice have themselves been fraught with complexity and contradictions. 
International conventions have proved unable to resolve inherent conflicts, particularly between 
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‘just deserts and welfarist perspectives’. In highlighting the tensions inherent in the Beijing Rules, for 
example, she observes that: 
Juvenile justice institutions are charged with the requirement to meet the needs of the child, 
protect his or her basic rights at the same time as meeting the needs of society.... 
Procedures should protect the rights of the child…, promote participation (including that of 
parents) and decisions should be in the best interests of the child’. (McAra, 2010, p. 291-2) 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the practice arena is also characterised by inconsistencies, with ‘elements 
of each of the…four paradigms…embedded in almost all western systems’ (p. 292). In England, it is 
observed, restorative measures such as the referral order sit alongside risk-based assessment 
mechanisms and rehabilitative interventions (such as the Youth Rehabilitation Order itself); whereas 
in Scotland, it seems that the longstanding welfare-led system has now been modified with the 
inclusion of restorative schemes, punitive antisocial behaviour measures and the emergence of the 
risk factor discourse in the policy domain. McAra concludes, though, that even obvious 
inconsistencies may not be unduly problematic, in a functional sense, if they offer a pragmatic basis 
for compromise, acting, in effect, to provide reciprocal legitimation for competing positions (p. 293). 
Of course, it remains important to consider the practical consequences of interactions between 
different paradigms, and their relative degrees of influence, as youth justice systems themselves 
develop and change. The emergence of the restorative justice perspective, for instance, appears to 
have been relatively recent, and yet also seems to have changed the penal landscape quite 
significantly over a relatively short period of time (see below). It is also subject to specific localised 
influences however, and as McAra (2010, p. 312) reminds us ‘that the capacity of governments (or, 
indeed, individuals or agencies) to effect youth justice reform is likely to be constrained by the 
broader cultural context…’.  
It is also therefore important to remind ourselves at this point, that the decision to opt for one or 
other paradigm represents a normative as well as a practical decision, and it will always remain 
necessary to acknowledge this dimension in our deliberations over what a youth justice system 
should look like. 
 
Applying models (1): plus ça change…? 
As noted previously, there is a tendency in accounting for change in youth justice to make claims of 
relatively neat periodisations and clear disjunctures, with distinctive phases during which one or 
another model is dominant, and then becomes subsumed by a radical shift in the direction of 
another paradigm. This, though, is perhaps to overstate the sense of rupture, and to underestimate 
the extent of continuity and coexistence between different sets of operating principles. In the 1970s, 
for example, at the apogee of welfarism in England and Wales, the institutionalisation of young 
people escalated significantly, both for reasons of ‘need’ and ‘desert’ (Thorpe et al, 1980, p. 29). The 
sense of sudden shifts engendered by the idea of periodization also, perhaps, tends to imply a 
greater sense of intentionality and coherence about the changes engendered than is the case in 
practice.  
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Similar questions are also posed in relation to the arguments recently aired over whether or not 
there is evidence of global ‘convergence’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006, p. 436) and homogenisation, 
associated with a particular phase of social and economic development, or whether distinctive 
‘models’ will continue to exist ‘linked to differing types of political economy’ (p. 452), and perhaps 
even according to different local and cultural dynamics within jurisdictions, as in the ‘dragonisation’ 
thesis as applied to Wales (Haines, 2009). Equally, in the same vein, we might be drawn to the 
question of when and how new social configurations and possibilities might emerge, which in turn 
could prompt the articulation of innovative approaches to youth justice, as has perhaps been the 
case with the restorative movement (Hazel, 2008). 
Hazell (2008), though, certainly does not appear to subscribe to the ‘periodisation’ thesis, viewing all 
developments in youth justice, including innovations such as restorative practices, as ‘really an 
accumulation of policies and practices developed historically against the background of competing 
pressures’ (p. 67), deriving from international obligations, professional interests, and political and 
media opinion. Each of the solutions deriving from these pressures can, nonetheless, ‘still be 
considered in the framework of welfarism and justice’, determined by the specific contextualised 
resolution of the tension between the treatment of ‘young offenders’, as ‘young’ first and foremost, 
or principally as ‘offenders’ (p. 69; and see Haines et al [2013] on ‘children first’).  
This might perhaps be thought to be sufficient to account for the recent rediscovery of 
‘rehabilitation’ by UK governments, and other leading figures in policy formulation in respect of 
England and Wales, as a straightforward reaction to the dominance of an excessively punishment-
oriented regime established over the preceding fifteen years or so. This shift of policy focus in fact 
pre-dates the interventions of an apparently ‘liberal’ Justice Secretary in the form of Kenneth Clarke 
(see Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008, for example), and appears to have 
survived his departure, but its acceleration is closely associated with his brief period of office. 
Making his lack of enthusiasm for the use of custody explicit, he began to argue for measures which 
would ‘break the cycle’ of reoffending (Channel 4 News, 7th Dec 2010), and suggested that there is a 
need to address underlying problems with mental health, alcohol or drugs, in order to discourage 
recidivism, rather than simply to ‘lock them up’.  These ideas were articulated rather more fully and 
systematically in the incoming coalition government’s Green Paper Breaking the Cycle (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010): 
Intervening early in the lives of children at risk and their families, before behaviour becomes 
entrenched can present our best chance to break the cycle of crime.... 
We need a local, joined up approach to address the multiple disadvantages that many young 
offenders have and the chaotic lifestyles.... 
We are working with partners to build on existing projects that seek to divert young people 
to services such as mental health or family support, to help address the reasons why they 
offend and ensure that young people receive the most appropriate intervention at the 
earliest opportunity. (Ministry of Justice, 2010, p. 68)  
In one sense, this can be taken as a dramatic rejection of developments over the previous fifteen 
years or so (Briggs, 2013, p. 27), with that period’s increased reliance on custody; and its general and 
pervasive tone of containment and control permeating all aspects of the intervention repertoire, 
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including community ‘punishments’. Nonetheless, it was the previous government which had 
introduced the Youth Rehabilitation Order in 2010, and had overseen the initial stages of a 
significant decline in the use of criminalising interventions with young people reported for offending. 
This was not perhaps the emergence of a new ‘model’ of youth justice, but the reassertion of a 
consistent strand in policy and practice (‘welfarism’) which had simply become less influential in the 
immediately preceding period of time, as Hazel (2008) might have anticipated, perhaps.  
Indeed, as long as fifty years previously, government had been committed to a ‘rehabilitative’ 
perspective: 
it is important to ensure that one whose delinquency results from more deep-rooted causes 
and calls for lasting treatment should receive the kind of help and guidance he needs at the 
earliest possible stage.... (Home Office, 1960, p. 4) 
And, later in the same decade, notwithstanding a change of government, ‘welfare’ arguments were 
reiterated, more strongly, if anything: 
It has become increasingly clear that social control of harmful behaviour by the young, and 
social measures to help and protect the young, are not distinct and separate processes. The 
aims of protecting society from juvenile delinquency, and of helping children in trouble to 
grow up into mature and law-abiding persons are complementary and not contradictory. 
(Home Office, 1968, p. 4) 
Thus, perhaps, the contemporary language of ‘rehabilitation’ is not so much a ‘revolution’ as a 
reassertion of a long-established and continuing strand of conventional wisdom in the youth justice 
arena (Hendrick, 2006; Hazel, 2008). Some of the proposals associated with its contemporary 
appearance do offer the appearance of innovation, of course, such as the ‘payments by results 
model’ proposed in Breaking the Cycle (Ministry of Justice, 2010, p. 39), but the ‘results’ specified 
are couched in the conventional language of rehabilitation, public protection and punishment, with 
a brief nod in the direction of reparation (p. 40). Rehabilitation was thus promoted as a 
counterweight to the overwhelming emphasis on containment and control, evident in youth justice 
policy for a period of at least fifteen years, beginning in the early 1990s – and, ironically, triggered in 
part by the intervention of the self-same political figure of Kenneth Clarke in his earlier stint as 
Home Secretary, when he promised new custodial measures to deal with ‘really persistent, nasty 
little juvenile offenders’ (The Independent, 28 Feb 1993). 
Similarly, the occurrence of a ‘punitive turn’ in New Zealand (McAra, 2010, p. 311) might be 
associated with the reassertion of a ‘justice’ (just deserts) perspective in the context of a long-
established welfare-oriented model of practice in youth justice, perhaps. Parallel concerns have 
been expressed about developments in Scotland, too, where threats to its predominantly welfarist 
orientation have been identified periodically (McAra, 2004, for example). 
These developments may at the same time suggest a continuing challenge for those working in 
youth justice, associated with the limitations imposed by the boundaries of what is ‘thinkable’; that 
is, the extent to which the ways in which a phenomenon is conceptualised are bounded by cultural 
or political constraints, which may render a particular way of framing the problematic behaviour of 
young people more or less acceptable, and in some cases literally ‘inconceivable’. The common 
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tendencies of welfare and justice models alike to individualise, problematise, decontextualise and 
‘other’ young people in trouble may be examples of these kind of unacknowledged constraints on 
our ways of thinking, just as they may represent shared failings in the attempt to develop a fully 
rounded view of the problem represented by ‘youth crime’. 
 
Applying models (2): discontinuity and distinctiveness 
There are others, however, who would argue that youth justice is not trapped in a never-ending 
cycle of action/reaction between the polar opposites of ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ models, but that 
contemporary developments have indicated the possibility of thinking more widely and more 
creatively about the possibilities for transformation. According to this perspective, more recently 
emerging models, such as ‘actuarial’, ‘restorative’ and ‘participatory’ approaches (Winterdyk, 1997; 
McAra, 2010) are not mere ‘variations’ on the longer established themes of welfare and justice 
(Hazel, 2008, p. 26), but represent entirely new thinking and possibilities. 
The emergence of the ‘risk factor paradigm’ (Case and Haines, 2009), and actuarial intervention 
strategies, in the late 1990s (Smith, 2006; Briggs, 2013) might be held to represent a distinct 
departure from previous approaches, reflecting wider developments in the political economy (Beck, 
1992). This perspective maintains a punitive ethos in the same way as might some interpretations of 
just deserts principles, for example, but departs from them significantly in the sense that it no longer 
views the young person as a rational actor, but merely as a source of quantifiable threat. Hazell 
(2008) makes this distinction clearly, associating each of these positions with different ideological 
perspectives as well (‘classical’ vs ‘right realist’, p. 25).  
The assumptions underpinning the actuarial approach are exemplified, of course, in the proliferation 
of risk-based assessment tools, and graded interventions which are believed to be ‘evidence-based’, 
and objective. The distinctive views, needs and interests of young people equally become 
discounted in this model: 
The Scaled Approach… describes the need for targeted interventions based on each person’s 
level of risk but makes no mention of the need to involve them in either the assessment of 
that risk or determining the interventions that will help them (Hart and Thompson, 2009, p. 
13) 
Briggs (2013) has confirmed the dominance of ‘risk’ in shaping the practice of those engaged in 
youth justice assessments in England and Wales, as effectively prescribed for them by the 
mandatory ASSET assessment tool; although he also acknowledges that practitioners ‘have… 
attempted to create their own rules regarding the allocation of treatment/welfare based 
interventions’ (Briggs, 2013, p. 25), demonstrating a degree of ‘resistance’ and continuing 
commitment to welfare-based practice. 
Similarly, the recent emergence, legitimation and expansion of the place assigned to restorative 
practice in the youth justice system might also be seen as the incipient stages in the establishment 
of a credible alternative to conventional models; and the extension of scope for this kind of 
intervention under the post-2010 coalition government (Smith, 2013) might also be viewed as 
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providing further impetus behind this. This government made clear, for example, its intentions to 
leave the resolution of social problems to communities, and for the state to step back: 
The solution to your community’s problems will not come from officials sitting in the Home 
Office working on the latest national action plan. They will come from the homes of our 
citizens, from the heads of our police officers, council employees and housing associations, 
and from the hearts of our social workers….We will put power into the hands of our citizens. 
We will put our trust into the professionals. And we expect everybody to take responsibility, 
take action, get involved…. (May, 2010) 
The restorative model as envisaged here, and indeed as realised in some practice settings (Haines 
and O’Mahony, 2006), can be distinguished from conventional welfare/justice approaches in a 
number of respects, including the diminution of the role of the state in favour of community-based 
offence resolution (McAra, 2010, p. 291). It is also distinctive (but not exclusively so) to the extent 
that it sees children reported for offences as rational actors, and as having a proactive role in 
contributing to what is essentially an ‘integrative’ rather than punitive process. Whilst some clearly 
envisage restorative justice becoming the dominant frame through which youth offending will be 
seen and resolved (Walgrave, 2008), an important distinction is made between ‘restorative justice’ 
and ‘restorative approaches’, with the implication that the latter can indeed be subsumed under 
conventional justice-oriented systems: 
The theory-based distinctiveness of restorative vs. traditional justice is obviated once the 
objective of implementing a wholly restorative justice-based system is compromised by the 
enduring presence of retributive/punitive elements. From here on, it is no longer possible to 
talk about restorative justice as such. Restorative approaches on the other hand, can be 
implemented, in both theory and practice, amongst a range of other sentencing options… 
within traditional justice models. (Haines and O’Mahony, 2006, p. 118) 
Certainly, the latter portrayal is redolent of the very hesitant and limited incorporation of 
‘restorative’ measures into the reformed youth justice system under New Labour (Smith, 2013), and 
this in turn appears to offer partial vindication of Hazell’s (2008, p. 54) implicit conclusion that, 
empirically at least, restorative practice can only be assessed as a ‘middle ground’ variation of 
traditional welfare/justice models. 
 
Developing alternative models: towards ‘welfare + rights’? 
If we are to conclude that the recent emergence of new models, such as the actuarially-based ‘risk 
factor paradigm’ and the ‘integrative’ restorative justice approach, is indicative of the capacity for 
reframing youth justice outside and beyond the traditional welfare/justice dichotomy (accepting 
that this is not a ‘given’), might it then also be possible to conceptualise and develop other systemic 
models, drawing upon and extending existing theories and practices which have at least sown the 
seeds of such developments. Indeed, earlier typologies have offered such possibilities already, with 
Winterdyk (1997, p. xi) outlining what he describes as a community-based ‘participatory’ approach 
relying on principles of minimum intervention, to be found in practice in Japan (Yokoyama, 1997) 
(although see Fenwick, 2006, for a rather different view of trends in that country, just a few years 
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later). Cavadino and Dignan (2006) also include ‘minimal intervention’ as the defining characteristic 
of one of the ‘alternative models’ offered in their typology, characterised somewhat surprisingly by 
Scotland, in their view – England and Wales during the 1980s might have been a better exemplar, 
although here too the question of whether it became the prevailing ethos, or merely reflected a 
pragmatic (and as it proved, unsustainable) accommodation with welfare/justice ideologies was 
unresolved (Smith, 1989). 
By contrast, certain recent developments might give further support for the recognition of a 
systematic and distinctive ‘model’, consistent with notions of ‘welfare rights’. A supporting rationale 
for this paradigm has been articulated by Scraton and Haydon (2002), who drew attention to the 
increasing prominence of notions of ‘rights’ and ‘participation’ in the context of childhood, and 
suggested that this might form a principled framework for progressive developments in youth 
justice. Starting from a similar position as McAra (2010), they view ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ approaches 
as being ‘integrated’ (Scraton and Haydon, 2002, p. 311), rather than exclusive of each other, they 
argue instead for a systematic incorporation of rights into the heart of practice. They question the 
potential for developing genuinely restorative interventions when they ‘are not imprinted on a clean 
slate’ but are ‘attempted in a reactive context of crime and punishment’ (p. 316). Rather, 
consideration should be given to ‘universal’ statements of rights to act as the starting point for 
resolving the range of conflicts and harms, including ‘youth crime’, which characterise and impact 
upon society in a general sense. 
Acknowledging the shortcomings in the implementation of rights instruments such as the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the undoubted hostility to ‘children’s rights’ in the public 
and political arena (p. 323), they nonetheless argue for the implementation of the convention 
‘grounded in a welfare approach’ which would recognise the distinctive features of childhood (see 
Smith, 2010), but also recognising the specific participation rights associated with this. In contrast to 
conventional ‘welfare’ approaches, this perspective ‘does not mean a return to hidden, arbitrary and 
discretionary punitive welfare interventions’ (p. 324), but offers safeguards, grounded in children’s 
capacity to speak and act on their own behalf: 
The real potential of a positive rights-based welfare approach is its challenge to 
constructions of children as innocent, vulnerable and weak through promoting their right to 
information, expression of views and their participation in decision-making. (Scraton and 
Haydon, 2002, p. 325) 
 
Putting it into practice? 
There are, indeed, some examples of practice initiatives which begin to exemplify this kind of 
orientation to youth justice. Thus, the National Youth Agency (2010) identifies a number of Youth 
Offending Services and/or Teams where children’s rights are incorporated in principles and practice. 
One YOT is reported to have ‘adopted Article 12’ of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (p. 8) as a core element of its ‘overall mission’, whilst others are reported to have created 
‘youth participation’ roles within the team: 
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Our head of service is the driver behind the creation of the participation officer role.... (YOT 
team member, quoted in National Youth Agency, 2010, p. 9) 
For several YOTs, participation has been prioritised as a management issue, and is embedded in 
routine operational and strategic processes, in principle. Sometimes, this might involve the head of 
service meeting directly with young people, to discuss ‘service issues’. 
 In one area, the entire Youth Offending Service aspires to implement the established ‘Hear by Right’ 
participation standards across its functions (p. 10). Some, too, could provide evidence of engaging 
young people in policy development, quality monitoring (p. 15) and staff recruitment (p. 16), as well 
as encouraging ‘young people’s involvement in the design and delivery’ of services (p. 11); whilst it 
was also reported that in some cases young people were able to contribute towards the planning 
and management of their intervention plans. 
In some cases, too, it appears that young people have been engaged in strategic and developmental 
roles, such as contributing to the design and organisation of specific interventions, such as ISSP 
(Intensive Surveillance and Support) and YISP (Youth Intervention and Support) programmes. Other 
examples of proactive approaches to participation included encouragement and use of meaningful 
feedback, rather than standardised forms which might be viewed as unhelpful (p. 11). 
So far the evidence for such developments may be viewed as limited, and there is no strong 
indication that any statutory service has managed to achieve participation in a thoroughly developed 
sense. In fact, the National Youth Agency inquiry found a number of significant barriers to progress, 
including inhospitable statutory requirements and an unwelcoming ‘culture’; lack of time and 
resources to engage young people; conflicting organisational expectations; lack of knowledge or 
understanding within staff teams; and a general absence of a strategic commitment to participatory 
principles. Indeed, the structural location of Youth Offending Teams and prevailing emphases on 
actuarial, risk-based and managerial frameworks for intervention (Smith, 2006; Case and Haines, 
2009; Souhami, 2011) indicate that the prospects for progressive development within a tightly 
circumscribed service setting are extremely limited. 
Nonetheless, a participatory approach is also a strong feature of the recently established Swansea 
Bureau, which adopts a diversionary approach to youth justice, explicitly located ‘within a children’s 
rights agenda that seeks to emphasise the centrality of youth participation and engagement… this 
approach seeks to give expression to Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’ (Haines et al, 2013, p. 180). The Bureau seeks to pursue a ‘children first, offenders second’ 
intervention strategy with the concurrent aims of diverting ‘young people away from the formal YJS 
and [preventing] re-offending via a child-appropriate, children first (offence/offender second) 
approach… through non-criminogenic, UNCRC-compliant, pro-social intervention’ (Haines et al, 
2013, p. 181). This approach is explicitly differentiated from a ‘‘pure’ (non-interventionist) 
diversionary approach’; distancing it from ‘minimum intervention’ models, which arguably do not 
address the ‘social’ processes and influences contributing to young people’s entry into the criminal 
justice system. Notably, though, this formulation does not entirely dispense with an 
acknowledgement of the (albeit residual) status of the ‘child as offender’ with its implicit 
endorsement of a crime prevention/crime control rationale, even if subsidiary (see McAra, 2010).  
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Thirdly, and also articulating a participatory ethos, whilst spared the constraints of the formal justice 
system, a practice model has recently been developed which seeks to embed participation in a more 
thoroughgoing manner into the justice process. UR Boss is a lottery-funded project, initiated and run 
by the Howard League, which has its roots in the organisation’s concerns at the shortcomings of 
conventional agencies, both legal and welfare, to recognise or address their needs and entitlements, 
or to provide an opportunity for young people to express their own wishes and concerns in this 
respect. The consequences for young people appeared to the Howard League to be a loss of access 
to their rights across the board, whether these are seen as ‘process’ rights (to do with the 
administration of the justice system), ‘situated’ rights (to with the specific judicial requirements 
imposed), or ‘generic’ rights (universal rights pertaining to all children and young people irrespective 
of their circumstances).  
Recognising that involvement with the justice system might involve more than a curtailment of 
‘freedom’, but the infringement of common standards of treatment, the Howard League concluded 
that a purely legalistic approach could not encompass all aspects of young people’s entitlements, 
and that a different frame of reference would be required. The project would be grounded in the 
organisation’s legal service, but would reach beyond it to enable young people to be heard: 
Young people will be at the heart of the legal service they will shape [and] manage and [they 
will] tell people about their lives and what they want and need. (Howard League, 2009) 
When it was established, UR Boss therefore sought to incorporate a broad view of participation in its 
approach to intervention with young people, and to ensure that they are given a voice in key issues 
which affect them, within and beyond the legal system.  
In its early days, UR Boss largely adopted a ‘casework’ approach, developing the legal service 
available so that it had the capacity to respond not just to judicial matters and aspects of their 
treatment within the justice system, but to advocate for young people in other respects, such as 
their accommodation, educational and welfare rights: 
Our lawyers will take direction from the young person about what they want, what their 
priorities and needs are, and how they want to proceed... We will work with them to identify 
the best way to resolve their issues.... (Howard League, 2009) 
Initial findings from the project evaluation suggested that this is an effective and well-received 
service (Smith and Fleming, 2011). Young people uniformly expressed strong praise of the support 
they were offered, both in feedback comments, and in follow-up interviews undertaken by the 
evaluators.  
Young people’s responses reflected the ‘all-round’ nature of the service, from addressing restrictions 
on the religious freedoms of Muslims in custody, to resolving the failure of local authorities to 
provide after care, and even to the extent of providing emotional support: 
 It has almost been like counselling at times. (Young person, UR Boss client) 
The commitment of the legal team to ‘their’ young people was a very strong common theme, 
evident both in the responses of the young people, and in the words of the UR Boss lawyers 
themselves in describing their approach to the work: 
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We are persistent and can go the extra mile – we can do work beyond legal aid, if we feel it 
is really necessary. (UR Boss solicitor) 
The Howard League has also sought to utilise the learning from its UR Boss programme to promote a 
wider incorporation of participatory principles in youth justice policy and practice (Smith et al, 2013). 
Young people have thereby taken a proactive role in determining the priorities to be pursued in 
achieving recognition of and access to their rights at all levels of the youth justice system. 
 
Emerging models of youth justice: challenges and possibilities 
In examining the development and application of ‘models’ of youth justice, I have sought to explore 
the conceptual and practical value of this kind of ‘ideal type’ in framing and accounting for the 
interplay between ideas and practice, and indeed, in shaping particular approaches to intervention.  
Broad agreement over the viability of this kind of heuristic tool as a means of characterising and 
understanding distinctive perspectives on youth justice suggests that there is some value in applying 
this sort of explanatory frame. There is clearly a significant measure of disagreement, though, about 
both the articulation of specific models, and the dynamic relationships between the different 
paradigms postulated; I have tended to side not with those analyses which see models of the youth 
justice ‘system’ as fixed in a constant and constricted relationship (Hazell, 2008), but rather with 
those who have seen them as negotiable and interactive (McAra, 2010), to the point of suggesting 
that there is scope for articulating a distinctive and progressive model geared towards ‘welfare + 
rights’. Some early examples of practice developments which exemplify elements of this model have 
also been sketched out here, although it is acknowledged that these represent possibilities and 
prospects rather than the finished project. 
A ‘welfare + rights’ model 
Key agency – Hybrid welfare/advocacy provider 
Tasks – Provide support/secure rights 
Understanding of young people’s behaviour – ‘Fettered’ choice 
Purpose of intervention – Enhance access to social goods 
Objectives – Social inclusion, ‘citizenship’, participation 
(after Winterdyk, 1997, p. xi) 
 
The emerging interest in applying principles of rights and participation in the sphere of youth justice 
is significant because it offers a means of reframing our assumptions about both basis and substance 
of intervention with young people who are identified as offenders. The notion that children hold 
certain inalienable rights irrespective of their situation or behaviour should provide food for thought 
(quite literally, if we take account of the UR Boss report of poor diets in custody; Howard League 
2011a!), and should prompt us to rethink the problems associated with access to educational 
opportunities or decent accommodation which compound the ‘punishment’ experienced by some 
young people, but clearly form no justifiable part of any penal sanction. One such right, of course, is 
the entitlement to be heard, and this further supports consideration of the place of ‘participation’ in 
helping to shape the collective response to behaviour by young people which is identified as 
problematic. If we start from this position, this will necessitate rethinking and reconstructing the 
youth justice system, in ways which are being modelled in some practice settings, in some forms of 
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‘engagement’ and participation identifiable in statutory youth offending services, and elsewhere, 
such as the UR Boss initiative.  
In pursuing the argument here in essentially abstract and idealised terms, I am conscious that I have 
not directly addressed the major contemporary social and structural challenges facing us, although I 
certainly do not want to convey the impression that they can simply be ‘wished away’. Nor is any of 
this to ignore the substantial challenges faced in gaining legitimacy for an approach which appears to 
be granting special privileges to young people whose rights are properly forfeited in the eyes of 
many by the very fact of their proven involvement in criminal or antisocial activities. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, if participation is interpreted in the minds of many practitioners merely as 
an indicator of compliance and the effectiveness of interventions (see Ipsos MORI, 2010, for 
example). But should practice and practitioners be judged (or make judgements) simply in terms of 
whether young people are ‘engaged’, or comply with the terms of their sentence, in any case? And 
should they be concerned only with outcomes in the form of reoffending rates, given how little we 
know about the relationship between practice and the likelihood of young people committing 
further offences – and how counterproductive the youth justice system often seems to be in this 
respect (McAra and McVie, 2007, for example)? Why should practice be defensive, rather than 
asserting the importance of universal rights, and making a case for interventions to be judged first 
and above all in these terms? So, for instance, access to a decent diet should not be an afterthought 
or a matter of chance in a justice system which recognises these rights (Howard League, 2010); 
education to the same standards as every child can expect should be a given; the entitlement to 
somewhere to live should not be forfeited by virtue of a prior offence; and, the same safeguards and 
protections should apply as to any child or young person. If interventions with young people in the 
justice system put these principles first, irrespective of the sanctions applied, young people would 
clearly be better served; and wouldn’t we all? 
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